INTRODUCTION
MOST APPLICATIONS OF NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY build on such solution concepts as Nash equilibrium. As is well known by now, the rationalistic foundation of this approach is quite demanding. Not only is it required that agents be optimizers, but it also presumes a large degree of coordination of different agents' expectations (see, e.g., Tan and Werlang (1988) , and Aumann and Brandenburger (1992)). In recent years researchers have investigated alternative foundations of Nash equilibrium play. Particularly promising seems the approach taken in evolutionary game theory. Instead of asking if agents are rational in some epistemologically well-defined sense, one asks if evolutionary selection processes induce a tendency towards aggregate Nash equilibrium behavior. In other words, one then investigates the validity of Friedman's (1953) "as if' paradigm in the context of strategic interaction.
The idea of an "as if' interpretation of equilibrium points, however, dates back to the early days of Nash equilibrium: "We shall now take up the "mass-action" interpretation of equilibrium points. ... It is unnecessary to assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total structure of the game, or the ability and inclination to go through any complex reasoning processes. But the participants are supposed to accumulate empirical information on the relative advantages of the various pure strategies at their disposal.
To be more detailed, we assume that there is a population (in the sense of statistics) of participants for each position of the game. Let us also assume that the "average playing" of the game involves n participants selected at random from the n populations, and that there is a stable average frequency with which each pure strategy is employed by the "average member" of the appropriate population.
Since there is to be no collaboration between individuals playing in different positions of the game, the probability that a particular n-tuple of pure strategies will be employed in a playing of the game should be the product of the probabilities indicating the chance of each of the n pure strategies to be employed in a random playing. ... the connection between evolutionary selection in n-player games and Nash equilibrium is weaker than it may first appear.
Since these negative results concern individual points in the strategy space, it is natural to turn to sets instead. Nontrivial connected sets of Nash equilibria are endemic in normal-form games that derive from extensive forms, and part of the refinement literature has also turned to set-valued solution concepts in order to cope with existence problems.
There are a number of set-valued approaches in the literature on evolutionary game theory as well. Thomas (1985) develops a set-valued generalization of the static concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (Maynard Smith and Price (1973) ). Swinkels (1992a Swinkels ( , 1992b ) also proposes set-valued generalizations of evolutionarily stable strategies and shows that those sets contain sets of Nash equilibria which meet certain refinement criteria. Swinkels (1993) deduces the latter from dynamic asymptotic stability of sets in a selection dynamics from a broad class.
In the present paper we focus on asymptotic stability of a certain class of strategy sets, namely faces of the mixed strategy space of the game. A face is the Cartesian product of sets of mixed strategies, one set for each player, each of which consists of all mixtures over some subset of the player's pure strategy set. At one extreme end of this spectrum there are individual pure strategy combinations (minimal faces). The opposite extreme is the set of all mixed strategy combinations in the game (the maximal face). Dynamic stability properties of faces can thus be associated with predictions in terms of subsets of pure strategies, one subset for each player position.
The focus on asymptotic stability is due to the fact that this property, unlike the weaker criterion of Lyapunov stability, is a "structurally robust" property in the sense that it is not destroyed by small perturbations of (the vector field of) the dynamics. In particular, asymptotic stability is preserved even if small fractions of a population occasionally "mutate," "experiment," or "make mistakes," thus generating small shocks to the population state.
A similar robustness criterion motivates the focus on faces. Since in many applications only broad qualitative features of the selection dynamics are know or assumed, it is desirable that the sets under consideration be dynamically stable in a fairly wide class of selection dynamics. We show that such broader robustness of dynamic stability properties disqualifies all (closed) sets in the (relative) interior of any face. Hence, when such robustness is called for, the restriction to sets which are faces is not so severe, and asymptotic stability provides predictions which are immune to small amounts of (unmodeled) drift.
Our main result is a characterization of all faces which are set-wise asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a class of dynamics which contains all aggregate monotonic selection dynamics. The characterizing criterion is that the set in question be "closed" under a certain correspondence which we call the "betterreply" correspondence-in analogy with the well-known best-reply correspondence used in noncooperative game theory. This "new" correspondence assigns to each mixed strategy combination cr those pure strategies for each player which give that player at least the same payoff as she has in cr. Such pure strategies are thus weakly better replies to o-than o-is itself. We call a product set of pure strategies closed under the better-reply correspondence if the image under this correspondence of every mixed strategy combination with support in the set is contained in the set. (Such a set is necessarily "closed under rational behavior," or a curb set; see Basu and Weibull (1991) .)
The equivalence of closure under the better-reply correspondence and asymptotic stability of the associated face provides an operational criterion by means of which pure strategy subsets spanning an asymptotically stable face can be identified, a criterion based exclusively on the data of the game. In particular examples this criterion has significant cutting power (see Section 6). However, as yet the strength of the criterion in general remains an open issue. Therefore, there may be many games where few pure strategies can be "robustly" rejected on grounds of dynamic social evolution as modeled here.
There is a stark contrast between "robust" evolutionary predictions and noncooperative game theory concerning completely mixed Nash equilibria. For while these pass all the Nash equilibrium refinements based on strategy perturbations ("trembles"), no such equilibrium is robustly stable in the present class of evolutionary selection dynamics. More precisely, even if such an equilibrium is dynamically stable in some aggregate monotonic selection dynamics, it is unstable in others. Hence, unless we are convinced that "real life" adaption is well described by dynamics in the "stable subclass," we may have to live with the possibility of ever-lasting oscillations in certain aggregate social behaviors. 2 We also show that a face spanned by a product set of pure strategies which is closed under the better-reply correspondence contains an essential component of Nash equilibria. That is, it contains a closed and connected set of Nash equilibria such that every nearby game, in terms of pure strategy payoffs, has a nearby Nash equilibrium. This is one of the most stringent set-wise refinements from the noncooperative game theory literature, implying strategic stability in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) .
Put together with the above characterization result, one obtains that an asymptotically stable face contains an essential component of Nash equilibria. This implication parallels Theorem 1 in Swinkels (1993) . He shows that if a set is asymptotically stable in a selection dynamics from a broad class, and meets a certain topological condition, met by any face, then it contains a hyperstable set of Nash equilibria in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) .
The material is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation and basic definitions. Section 3 provides, in a unified and sometimes more general form, essentially known results on point-wise stability (except for Propositions 2 and 3). All proofs for this section have been relegated to an Appendix at the end of the paper. In Section 4 we elaborate on a class of correspondences which we call behavior correspondences, of which the best-reply and better-reply correspon2Even if a solution persistently oscillates the time average of the population state may be of significance. In games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium, for instance, it converges under the replicator dynamics to the equilibrium, provided the closure of the orbit is interior (cf. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) The correspondence assigning mixed best replies is denoted i3 = E Pi , where
It is well known that both ,B and /3 are u.h.c. correspondences on A. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy combination o-E A which is a fixed point of /3. The set of Nash equilibria of a game F is denoted by E(F) = {oE AlIce fi(o)}.
A strict equilibrium is a strategy combination o-E A which is its own unique best reply, i.e., such that {or} = ,B(o-). Every strict equilibrium o-e E(F) is pure, so one may view it as a fixed point of /3 in S. In other words: Strategies which are at least as good as the average grow at nonnegative rates, and strategies which perform worse than average are precisely those which are selected against.5 This class of selection dynamics contains all AMS dynamics and turns out to be of special significance for the present approach. For a SPS dynamics the ordering of growth rates of population shares is not determined from payoffs, while for a monotonic selection dynamics it is. On the other hand, for a monotonic selection dynamics the signs of growth rates of population shares of strategies that do neither best nor worst are not determined, while for a SPS dynamics they are. So, though the intersection of the class of SPS dynamics and monotonic selection dynamics is nonempty, the two are distinct classes.
Aggregate monotonicity, which is thus a special case of both monotonic and sign-preserving selection dynamics, can be derived from underlying microeconomic models that assume a certain imitative adaptation of the behavior of individuals. In large populations one may imagine the following scenario (for details see Bjornerstedt and Weibull (1993)): While at each instant of time every individual is bound to use a particular pure strategy, occasionally one or the other individual reviews her or his strategy choice. Suppose these "arrival times" are governed by independent Poisson processes, which may depend on the current population state. Once an individual reviews her strategy, she will switch to a new pure strategy with a conditional probability that may depend positively on its current success (payoff) and popularity (population frequency). Note that such an adaption process does not presume any knowledge about payoffs to other player positions in the game. If, in particular, individuals with currently less successful strategies review their strategy choice at a linearly higher rate 5A similar, though slightly stronger definition of "sign-preserving" dynamics appears in Nachbar (1990).
than individuals with more successful strategies, and/or the conditional switching probability towards any pure strategy is proportional to its popularity, with the proportionality factor linearly increasing in the strategy's current success, then an AMS dynamics results. In particular, both the replicator dynamics and its payoff-normalized version can be so derived. Without the linearity assumptions these imitation processes merely result in SPS or monotonic selection dynamics, depending on the nature of the imitation mechanism.
Given 
From the discussion it is clear that a Nash equilibrium is a rest point for any sign-preserving or monotonic selection dynamics (but not vice versa): E( F) c F(F).
But the connection between evolutionary dynamics and Nash equilibrium extends further. For monotonic single-population selection dynamics in symmetric two-player games it has been shown that any (Lyapunov) stable state constitutes a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium, and that convergence from an initial state in which all pure strategies are present implies that the limit state corresponds to a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium (Nachbar (1990)). On the other hand, if a state is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics, then it corresponds to an isolated and (symmetric trembling-hand) perfect Nash equilibrium (Bomze (1986)).
These positive results carry over to multi-population dynamics in symmetric and asymmetric n-player games (Nachbar ( For predictive purposes, however, these dynamic properties appear too weak. 8 By single-population dynamics we mean that interacting individuals are drawn from the same population.
For if a population state is reachable but not Lyapunov stable, then arbitrary small perturbations of the state-by (unmodeled) "mutations," "mistakes," or "experiments," say-can lead the population far away. Likewise, if a population state is Lyapunov but not asymptotically stable, then certain small shocks to the state will dislocate the population state permanently (for a discussion of the related notion of "evolutionary drift" see Binmore and Samuelson (1994) ). By contrast, the more stringent criterion of asymptotic stability does guarantee a "local pull" towards the state (or set) in question. In particular, asymptotic stability (of a point or set) is preserved (for some nearby point or set) even if the vector field is slightly bent inwards at the boundary of A as, for instance, by small amounts of mutations.
However, it has been shown that in the replicator dynamics no interior population state is asymptotically stable (cf. Amann and Hofbauer ( This is the face of the polyhedron A spanned by X. Such a face (X) is itself a polyhedron of mixed strategy combinations associated with the reduced game in which the pure strategy set of player i EcK X is Xi.
Basu and Weibull (1991) call a set X E P closed under rational behavior (curb)
if it contains all its best replies, i.e., if 13( A(X)) cX, and call it tight curb if ,(( A(X)) =X. More generally: given any behavior correspondence so e cP, we here call a set Xe P closed under (p if sp(A(X)) cX and fixed under sD if cp( A(X)) = X."1 Clearly X E P is a curb set if it is closed under some behavior correspondence so E (, by ,(3A(X)) c sp( A(X)) c X. A set X E P is a minimal closed set under so if it is closed under so and contains no proper subset which is closed under sp. The next result is a key observation for the subsequent analysis. Essentially it provides a generalization of a property of strict equilibria which non-strict Nash equilibria lack, and which, in a sense, is the converse of the defining property of Nash equilibrium. While a strategy combination u e A is defined as a Nash equilibrium whenever it is contained in its set of best replies, {u} C,1(u), only strict equilibria have the complementary (curb) property of containing all their best replies, 13(u) c {u}. In the first case unilateral deviations are nonprofitable; some may be costly and others costless. In the second case all unilateral deviations are costly. Not surprisingly, strict equilibria, therefore, satisfy all the requirements for which the refinement literature has asked. In particular, every strict equilibrium is pure (a vertex of A) and it is the unique best reply not only to itself but, by continuity of the payoff function, also to all strategy combinations in some neighborhood of itself. Formally, if u-E E(F) is strict, then there is some neighborhood W of u such that 13(?/nA)c{u}. Hence, such an equilibrium is robust to all sufficiently small perturbations of the players' beliefs about each others' play.
The following lemma generalizes this observation, first, from the best-reply correspondence to all behavior correspondences, and, second, from individual strategy combinations to sets of strategy combinations. As a special case the result holds for all curb sets. (Note that the proof of Lemma 2 relies exclusively on the fact that behavior correspondences are closed mappings.) 
SET-WISE STABILITY
We are now in a position to establish a characterization of asymptotic stability of faces of the polyhedron A of mixed strategy combinations, a characterization based exclusively on the data of the game under consideration. By applying this characterization no detailed information on the dynamics is needed in order to judge whether a given face is asymptotically stable or not; it is sufficient that the dynamics meets the conditions of a sign-preserving selection (SPS) dynamics. In particular, the class of asymptotically stable faces agrees for all such dynamics. Combining Theorem 1 with Proposition 4(b) yields that any face which is asymptotically stable in some SPS dynamics contains a closed and connected set of Nash equilibria which is essential, contains a hyperstable set, and hence a strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986):
COROLLARY 4: If a face A(X) is asymptotically stable in some SPS dynamics, then it contains an essential component of Nash equilibria, and thus also a hyperstable and a strategically stable set.
In the sense of set inclusion there is thus a link between asymptotic stability in evolutionary dynamics and strategic stability. The converse of Corollary 4 is trivial: Any strategically stable set, or essential component of Nash equilibria, is contained in some (minimal) face spanned by a set X E P which is closed under the better-reply correspondence.
As mentioned inthe introduction, the claim that an asymptotically stable face of A contains a hyperstable subset also follows from Theorem 1 of Swinkels (1993) (1986, p. 1022) ), Corollary 4 also follows from Swinkels' result.
. His result states that if a closed set A c A is (i) asymptotically stable in some myopic adjustment dynamics, a class which includes all SPS dynamics, and (ii) has a basin of attraction which contains a (relative) neighborhood of A the closure of which is homeomorphic to A, then A contains a hyperstable subset.'2 The topological condition (ii) is clearly met by all asymptotically stable faces of A. Since a set is hyperstable (roughly) if it is minimal with respect to essentiality (cf. Kohlberg and Mertens
The hypothesis in Corollary 4 and in Swinkels' result, asymptotic stability of a given set, may, however, often be hard to verify. In such a case Theorem 1 is helpful, because it provides an operational necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic stability, at least for a certain class of subsets of A and selection dynamics.
This raises the following issue: Which (closed) subsets of A, other than its faces, are asymptotically stable in which class of selection dynamics? There is a trade-off here between the precision of evolutionary predictions, in the sense of "small" asymptotically stable sets, and the robustness of those predictions with respect to the dynamics. In many applications only broad qualitative features of the dynamics are known or assumed. So a fair amount of robustness of stability properties with respect to the details of the dynamics seems desirable. But such a robustness with respect to a subclass of selection dynamics may require relatively "large" sets.
In particular, it turns out that even a subclass of SPS dynamics, the AMS dynamics, is rich enough to disqualify all (closed) sets which belong to the relative interior of any of the faces of A.3 No such set can even be (Lyapunov) stable in all AMS dynamics, unless the relevant face consists entirely of rest points for all SPS and monotonic selection dynamics. Hence, one can disregard all relatively interior (closed) sets if one requires predictions to be robust across the class of AMS dynamics. a closed set A c int(A(X) ), for some X e P, is (Lyapunov) stable in all AMS dynamics, then A(X) c F( F).
PROPOSITION 5: If
PROOF: See Appendix.
An alternative robustness test is to require that the subsets under consideration be asymptotically stable in the benchmark case of the replicator dynamics. However, as pointed out in Section 3, no interior strategy combination is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics. The generalization of this claim to (relatively) interior closed sets is immediate. Therefore, to require asymptotic stability in the replicator dynamics again discards (relatively) interior closed sets. Clearly, when precise information on the dynamics is available, it is possible in some games to identify proper subsets of asymptotically stable faces which are themselves asymptotically stable or at least (Lyapunov) stable in that dynamics. This is the case, for instance, with the "matching pennies" game for which the solution paths to the replicator dynamics are closed orbits around the Nash equilibrium point. Although its unique (interior) Nash equilibrium constitutes a strategically stable singleton set, the only subset of A which is (Lyapunov) stable in all AMS dynamics is A itself. In fact, in this game the unique Nash equilibrium outcome is dynamically unstable in certain AMS dynamics which are arbitrarily close to the replicator dynamics (see the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix). Hence, in this sense, its (Lyapunov) stability in the replicator dynamics is not even locally robust in the space of AMS dynamics.
Another difference between strategic and evolutionary dynamic stability is that, though also some strategically stable sets may induce several outcomes (cf. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, Figure 11) ), for generic extensive-form games there exists at least one strategically stable set which induces a single outcome. However, as seen in the "matching pennies" game, a face which is asymptotically stable in all SPS dynamics need not correspond to a unique outcome, even if the face contains a strategically stable set which induces a single outcome.
Hence, evolutionary processes may result in paths along which also the outcome persistently oscillates, even in nondegenerate games. For, while in a completely mixed Nash equilibrium each player is indifferent between all her pure strategies, she is required to randomize in a particular fashion in order to keep the other players "in equilibrium." In an evolutionary setting, however, there is no outside coordination mechanism, and individuals now and then change strategy in the light of little information. In particular, they need not know the payoffs associated with other player positions. Therefore, there is a priori nothing there to "bring them to order."
EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1: Figure 1 shows the (reduced) normal form of a game where player 1 first chooses whether to take an outside option (sl) or to move into a 2 x 2 subgame of the "battle-of-the-sexes" type that consists of the last two strategies for both players (van Damme (1989, Figure 1) ). The game has two components of Nash equilibria, both of which contain subgame perfect equilibria: In the first component player 1 chooses her outside option and player 2 plays her first pure strategy with probability at least 1/3 (o-1h = 1,1/3 < o-2 1). The second component is the strict equilibrium, oQ2 = cr 2 =1. The first component does not contain a strategically stable set nor an equilibrium that satisfies forward induction in the sense of van Damme (1989, p. 485).
The game has three curb sets, S, X= {s2} X {52}, and Y= {s1, 2}2X {s , s2}, but only S and X are closed under -y. By Theorem 1 the (singleton) set X which induces the strategically stable outcome and satisfies forward induction in the sense of van Damme is the only asymptotically stable face (except for the full strategy set) in this game, for any SPS dynamics. Figure 1) ). In this game, player 1 observes a choice by nature assigning a type to her, "strong" with probability 0.9 and "weak" with probability 0.1. Then she sends either a "strong" or a "weak" signal. Upon seeing the signal, player 2 decides whether to retreat or fight. Normal form strategies correspond to the following choices: Player 1 can either always send a "strong" signal (sl), or send a "strong" signal when she is strong and send a "weak" signal when she is weak (S2), or send a "weak" signal when she is strong and send a "strong" signal when she is weak (se), or always send a weak signal (s4). Player 2 can either retreat upon seeing a "strong" signal and fight upon seeing a "weak" signal (sl), or always retreat (s2), or always fight (S3), or fight -upon seeing a "strong" signal and retreat upon seeing a "weak" signal (s4). The game has two connected components of Nash equilibria. In the first, "good" component player 1 always sends a "strong" signal and player 2 retreats upon seeing a "strong" signal but fights with probability at least 1/2 upon seeing a "'weak" signal (o-1I = 1, o-1 + o-22 = 1, o-2 2 1/2). In the second, "bad" component player 1 always sends a "weak" signal and player 2 retreats upon seeing a "weak" signal but fights with probability at least 1/2 upon seeing a "strong" signal (o-4 = 1, o22 + -24 = 1, 24 2 1/2).
The only set Ye P which spans a face containing the second, "bad" component and which is closed under y is the whole strategy set S. On the other hand, the first, '"good" component is contained in the face spanned be the set X = {s, s } X {sW, s2} E P, i.e., the set where player 1 either always sends a "strong" signal or sends a "strong" signal when she is strong and a "weak" signal when she is weak, and player 2 either retreats upon seeing a "strong" signal and fights upon seeing a "weak" signal or always retreats. From the payoffs in Figure 2 it is easy to verify that the set X is closed under the better-reply correspondence and, in fact, is a fixed set both under y and P3. So, in this example closure under -y selects the strategy subset that contains the "intuitive" pure strategies.
EXAMPLE 3: The payoff bi-matrix in Figure 3 shows a two-player game with three strategies for each player. The game has three Nash equilibria, one of which (in the lower right corner) is strict. The other two are mixed, one being the equilibrium of the "matching-pennies" game that consists of the first two strategies for each player. Whether the set X = {s1, s 2} x {s1, s2} is closed under y depends on the parameter x. If x is negative, then the set X is closed under y, otherwise not. However, for all x < 2 the X is closed under P. If x ? 0, then by Theorem 1 the face A(X) is not asymptotically stable in any SPS dynamics. Figure 4 illustrates some computer simulations of solution paths to the replicator dynamics starting near A(X) and converging to the strict equilibrium S = (s3, s3). Here x = 1.9, so X is closed under ,. In the diagram pj, resp. qj, denote the population shares using the jth pure strategy, for j = 1,2,3, for player roles 1, resp. 2. Note that the restriction of this game to mixed-strategy profiles in the face A(X) is, by itself, a constant-sum game with value 1 -x/2. If x is negative, then X is closed under y, and the constant-sum "subgame" has its own domain of attraction, just like a strict equilibrium. (In fact, the game then is a kind of generalized coordination game.) EXAMPLE 4: As a final example, consider the three-player 3 X 2 x 2 game of Figure 5 , in which player 1 chooses tri-matrix, player 2 row, and player 3 column. For any fixed pure strategy of the first player, players 2 and 3 face a symmetric 2 x 2 game. When player 1 uses her first strategy (sl), the first strategies of players 2 and 3 (sl and s', respectively) are strictly dominant. However, if players 2 and 3 would use those strategies, then player l's best reply is to switch to her second strategy (s2). But when player 1 uses her second strategy, the second strategies of players 2 and 3 (s2 and S3) are strictly dominant, and if they would use these, player l's best reply is her first strategy. When player 1 uses her third strategy (s3), finally, players 2 and 3 face a game of pure coordination.
It is not difficult to show that the product set X = {s, sXS2XS3EP obtained by taking all players' first two strategies constitutes (the maximal) curb set, i.e., it is closed under p3. But one can show that the excluded strategy, s3, is not strictly dominated. Hence, it is a priori possible that the population share using strategy s3 does not tend to zero along some interior solution paths. If this is the case even for (interior) trajectories starting arbitrarily close to the face spanned by X, then a set closed under ,B need not even attract a neighborhood. Indeed, computer simulations produce precisely such trajectories; see Figure  6 for solution orbits to the replicator dynamics. Since players 2 and 3 always This set is invariant and intersects the face spanned by X at its mid-point, a Nash equilibrium which constitutes a (singleton) strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . This illustrates why evolutionary predictions may have to be less precise than, say, strategically stable sets of Nash equilibria are. All interior trajectories which do not start in L will move outwards towards the edges of the polyhedron, but they will never come to a halt. Rather each such trajectory will visit each of the six vertices infinitely often. Since L is lower-dimensional than the polyhedron shown in Figure 6 , a prediction that concentrates on the Nash equilibrium will ignore the most likely results of evolution. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The results in the present paper suggest that set-wise criteria such as closure under a behavior correspondence may have stronger implications for dynamic evolutionary selection than the Nash equilibrium property has. This raises several further issues. Are similar methods capable of identifying faces which meet weaker stability criteria? Can the approach be generalized to a wider class of sets and/or dynamics (cf. Swinkels ( (i) First assume that 5f E E(F ) is asymptotically stable in the replicator equation. By Proposition 6 it must then be pure and by Corollary 3 it must be a strict equilibrium.
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